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STUDENT NOTES A'N!D RECENT CASES
FINALITY

OF

APPEAL ON

FINDINGS

OF

FACT

FOUND

BY

THE

STATE COMPENSATION Commissiomq.-In a recent West Virginia
case, the commissioner made a finding of fact that an abscess, in
applicants knee, giving rise to the disability for which compensation was claimed, was not caused by a bruise located just above
applicants knee, which bruise was proved to have been received
in the course of the employment, but that such disability was the
result of a recurrence of an old trouble caused by a gun shot
wound occurring twelve years before. Two doctors who had
treated the applicant testified that in their opinion the abscess
was a reappearance of the old trouble arising from shot embedded
in the flesh and lodged against the bone of -applicant's knee. They
admitted the "mere possibility" of the concurrence of the bruise
in causing the present trouble. The Supreme Court reviewed and
reversed the finding of the commissioner, and ordered compensation to be paid. Caldwell v. State Compensation Commissioner,
144 S. E. 568 (W. Va. 1928).
The ease therefore presents the question of the effect that will
-be given on appeal to findings of fact by the commissioner.
It is to be noted that some workmens compensation acts such as
that of MNassachusetts, Gen. Laws, Mass. (1921) ch. 152 §11,
specifically make the findings conclusive on appeal, while others
like the West Virginia act, CODE, c. 15P §43, provide for appeals
without designating the effect to be given, on appeal, to the commissioner's findings of fact. The court has interpreted the West
Virginia statute as not denying the court the power to review the
facts and that therefore it has such power. Poccardi v. State
Compensation Commissioner, 79 W. Va. 684, 91 S. E. 663. Admitting, then, that the court has the power under the statute to
review such findings, the question still remains whether it will do
so in a given case, or whether it will take cognizance of questions
of law only, as was said in Poccardi v. Public Service Commission,
75 W. Va. 542, 545, 84 S. E. 242, 243, L. R. A. 1916A 299. The
court in refusing to reverse the finding of the commissioner has
also held that generally the finding of the commissioner as to facts
would be given the same effect as a finding of a judge or a verdict
of a jury. Poccardi v. State Compensation Commission, supra.
It is generally said in the cases and by the text writers that in
the absence of statutory provision on the point, the findings of fact,
after a full hearing, will not be disturbed where they are supported
by evidence, and where the evidence is conflicting the finding, like
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the finding of a judge or the verdict of a jury, will be regarded as
conclusive. HONNoLD, WoRKMEN'S 'COMtPENSATI N, §242; Note in
L. R. A. 1916A 266; WoRRmM's COmPENSATioN ACTS, 28 R. C.
L. §116, and,0. J. §127, Poccardi v. Public Service Commission,
supra; Kenniston v. Thames Towboat Company, 89 Conn. "367, 94
AtI. 372; Peoria Cordage Company v. Industrial Board, 284 Ill.
90, 119 N. E. 996; Mueller Construction Company v. Industrial
Board, 28a Ill. 148, 118 N. E. 1028; Walker v. Industrial Accident
Commission, 177 Cal. 737, 171 Pac. 954; Heitz v. Ruppert, 218 N.
Y. 148, 112 N. E. 750. Where the facts are undisputed, it is
said, the question of whether or not the finding of the commissioner is supported by evidence, becomes on review a question of
law. Poccardi v. State Compensation Commissioner, supra;
Radtke Brothers, etc., Company v. Rutzinski, 174 Wis. 212, 183 N.
W. 168; Johnson v. A. C. White Lumber Company, 37 Ida. 617,
217 Pac. 979. And an adverse adjudication of applicants claim
may be revised and allowed on appeal. Poccardiv. Ott, 82 W. Va.
497, 96 S. E. 790.
It would seem that there was evidence here which reasonably
would have supported the finding of the commissioner. But the
court does not treat the case as one of conflicting evidence. It lays
down the liberal rule that where the evidence is "undisputed" and
where both favorable and unfavorable inferences may be drawn,
such inferences should be resolved in favor of the applicant. This
appears to be a follow-up of the rule established in Poccardi v.
Public Service Commission, supra, where it was held that in the
absence of conflict in the evidence adduced to show the claimants
right to participation in the compensation fund, the commissioner
is regarded in the appellate court as a demurrant to the evidence
and if the evidence would sustain a verdict of a jury in favor of
the claimant, the claim is regarded as sufficiently proved; and evidence, giving rise to inference consistent with the theory of liability
and inconsistent therewith in equal degree, is sufficient to sustain
applicants claim.
Does the case mean that the findings of the commissioner,
although supported by some evidence,, are not merely on that
account, final? While the decision may be somewhat difficult to
harmonize with the statement of the rule on this point as it is
generally stated in the cases and texts, and while it may therefore
indicate a tendency, (Brightman's Case, 220 Mass. 17, 107 N. E.
257; InternationalHarvester Company v. Industrial Commission,
,157 Wis. 167, 147 N. W. 53), on the part of the court to lean toward the theory of reviewability of such findings of fact, yet the
case accords with "a spirit of liberality," in the administration of
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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
the WoRm~mEN's Co PF sArioN ACT. Concurring Opinion of
Maxwell, J., Caldwell v. State Compensation Commissioner, supra,
State v. District Court, 131 Minn. 352, 155 N. W. 103, an attitude which, it is believed, is not at variance with the legislative
intent, and will, on the whole, prove socially desirable.
-JOHN D. ALDEmSON.

TORT -

PHYSICIAN 'S LIABILITY FOR ABANDONING

PATIENT. -

A

physician undertook to care for a woman in childbirth, gave her
medicine to stimulate delivery, and left saying that he would be
'back in a couple of hours. He failed to return when medical aid
became necessary. The court held that he was liable in tort for
the suffering caused the patient before another doctor could be
procured and that it was no excuse that the physician was attending another woman in childbirth at the time and was unable
to leave. Young v. Jordan, 145 S. E. 41 (W. Va. 1928).
As a general proposition where a physician has undertaken to
care for a patient he becomes liable for the exercise of such skill
and diligence as that of an ordinary, reasonably prudent physician
in the same or similar circumstances. Lawson v. Conaway, 37 W.
Va. 168, 16 S. B. 564; Dye v. Corbin, 59 W. Va. 266, 53 S. .
147. 'Courts have uniformly held that the abandonment of a
patient, who is in need of medical attention, without excuse or
sufficient notice to enable him to procure another physician is
actionable negligence. Some courts, as in the West Virginia case,
therofore, have given damages in tort for malpractice upon such
abandonment. Barbour v. Martin, 62 Maine 536; Ritchey v. West,
23 Ill. 329; Gerken v. Plimpton, 70 N. Y. S. 793; Lawson v. Conaway, supra; Sinclair v. Brunson, 212 Mich. 387, 180 N. W. 358.
Other courts have held, where there was a contract of employment,
actual or implied, that the abandonment was a breach of contract
and have predicated liability upon that ground. Hood v. Moffett,
109 Miss. 757; 69 So. 664; Ballou v. Prescott, 64 Me. 305;
Lathrope v. Flood, 135 Cal. 458, 67 Pac. 683.
Where the action is in tort the duty of care presumably arises
from the fact that the physician has undertaken to care for the
patient; he may not, therefore, abandon the case midway in its
course. The situation is analagous to that in Black v. Railway
Company, 193 Mass. 448, where the conductor on a ttain helped
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